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Abstract 
 
Women’s access to financial resources is popularly hailed and strongly evidenced to 
be a development tool that champions women’s economic empowerment. Globally, does 
economic empowerment through women’s access to formal financial resources translate 
to women’s political empowerment in established political institutions? To what extent do 
women’s use of formal financial resources (defined as use of financial and savings 
accounts, credit cards, and the taking of loans from financial institution) correlate with 
women’s political representation in national parliaments?  
The purpose of this thesis is to utilize cross-national data to investigate this question 
by examining the extent to which women’s access to formal financial services is correlated 
with increased women’s representation in national parliaments. This thesis will utilize 
data from the World Bank’s “Gender Statistics and Indicators” database from 195 
countries around the world to test the existence, direction, and strength of any potential 
relationship, controlling for important confounding variables. (World Bank, 2013) 
Statistically significant relationships that emerge will then be analyzed in the context of 
other scholarly works to draw conclusions, discuss policy implications, and suggest areas 
for further investigation. 
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I. Introduction 
 
When the Nobel Peace Prize was jointly awarded in 2006 to Bangladeshi banker 
Muhammad Yunus and the groundbreaking Grameen Bank that he founded, the world 
universally recognized and praised the banker and his bank for transforming the efforts of 
poverty alleviation to include a focus on financial empowerment by pioneering the 
concept of microfinance.  
The introduction of microfinance, an innovative financial tool that provides financial 
resources to low-income individuals, created a revolutionary shift in development 
economics as financial services to promoting empowerment of disadvantaged groups, 
particularly women, has gained new importance as a crucial policy priority. As explained 
by Yunus, “money begets money…If you have that money in your hand, you desperately 
try to make the best use of it and move ahead” (PBS). Yunus’s model of microfinance 
proved to promote such empowerment by providing women the opportunity to improve 
the status of their health, education, and standard of living. By highlighting the 
importance of access to capital in augmenting individual empowerment and improving 
such outcomes, Yunus pioneered a movement to increase financial resource accessibility 
to poor and underprivileged populations. Following the success of Yunus’ model, 
professionals in the field began to focus on access to financial resources as a key to 
women’s empowerment worldwide.  
While microfinance has received overwhelming attention in the field of development 
economics, a focus on providing formal financial resources to women around the world 
has become an increasingly popular and widely adopted policy priority. However, 
provided that microfinance functions on a small scale with benefits accruing to small 
selected groups, can the promise of women’s empowerment through financial 
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empowerment be achieved on a more macro level?  Is there evidence that women’s use of 
financial resources translates to women’s empowerment? In particular, do use of these 
financial resources reverberate into political empowerment of women in top political 
institutions?  
 If a relationship exists between women’s use of formal financial resources and 
women’s political representation, this could have important policy implications. The 
implications are especially meaningful in a world in which women made up 49.6% of the 
worldwide population yet only represented on average 18.3% of seats in national 
parliaments in 2011 (World Bank, 2013). The purpose of this thesis is to understand if 
there is a relationship between women’s use to formal financial resources and their ability 
to participate in formal political processes through representation in national political 
institutions; does the empowerment from women’s use of formal financial resources relate 
to any larger political empowerment in their inclusion in political representation?  
 
II. Background 
i. Women’s Access to Financial Resources  
Access to financial resources include a variety of financial products and services 
including personal and savings accounts, loans, and credit. Access to capital is derived 
from formal sources (such as banks or other financial institutions) or non-formal sources 
(such as family, friends, community organizations, non-profit organizations, or local 
lenders). It is well documented that women face higher barriers in access capital than do 
men. Surveys show that not only are women less likely to take out a loan than men, terms 
of borrowing are worse for women than men, including higher interest rates, higher 
collateral requirements, and shorter-term loans (IFC, 2011). In addition, women face 
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non-financial barriers to access capital. Such barriers include formal gaps such as 
inequality in property rights and legal capacity and non-formal gaps including gender 
discrimination and education and management differentials (IFC, 2011).  
The benefits of women’s access to financial resources are well documented in 
development literature. In fact, facilitating women’s access to finance has been shown to 
improve their access to markets, education, and healthcare and provide them greater 
autonomy and decision making within households. Given that women are more likely to 
make decisions that benefit the household and children, this leads to further development 
benefits that improve the welfare of children and families. (Kabeer 1998; Khandker 1998; 
Pitt and Khandker 1998). With independent access to financial resources, women can 
earn income and gain financial autonomy. Such autonomy helps to empower women, 
leading to improvements in the social and political status of women around the world.  
 
ii. Women’s Political Participation  
 Worldwide, women are underrepresented in the highest levels of political 
institutions. Despite the fact that women make up nearly half the population of every 
country around the world, they are do not participate in politics to nearly the same extent 
as men. In 2011, the average percentage of women represented in national parliaments 
worldwide was 20% and only 13 of 190 nations had a female head of government. There 
were only two nations where women made up at least 50% of the national legislature. 
Furthermore, only 15% of UN ambassadors and 17% of the world’s cabinet ministers 
were women (Paxton and Hughes). At lower levels of government, these numbers don’t 
improve significantly. Although exact numbers are difficult to locate to the diversity of 
political institutions at lower levels, Karl (1994) reports that women make up only a small 
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minority of legislative representatives, village councilors, town mayors, and cabinet 
members (both appointed and elected). 
 Why are women so greatly underrepresented? Several scholars offer differing 
explanations for why this disparity occurs.  According to Karl, the political culture of top 
political institutions is alien to women. Historically relegated to household duties, women 
have a shorter history of participation and less experience in campaigning. The process of 
reaching political office is male-dominated and women themselves avoid the “political 
fray.” Furthermore, women must overcome discrimination at all levels of the political 
process. In being relegated to traditional duties (to care for the household and family), 
female political participation is often seen as incompatible with these traditional roles 
which in turn leads to exclusion and discrimination, especially when these offices require 
appointments or nominations to be considered at top levels. In addition, women’s weak 
economic position may also inhibit their ability to participate in political processes. When 
lacking substantial funds of their own, women are more often than men unable to gain 
the experience or make the social connection needed to run successful campaigns (Karl, 
1994). Conway also offers further support for these theories, suggesting the impact of 
cultural expectations, the role of gatekeepers with men as powerbrokers, and the 
differential acquisition of skills required to gain office all contribute to the low proportion 
of women in public office (2001).   
 Although women face significant barriers to political participation and are greatly 
underrepresented in top political institutions, they have made significant progress in their 
political participation in the last century. While today, women are guaranteed the right to 
vote around the world, during the 19th century this right was denied to all women in 
every nation. The first woman elected to parliament was in Finland in 1907. Since then, 
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75% of countries have had women comprising at least 10% of national legislatures. In 
fact, the pace of this participation is rapidly increasing. According to Paxton and Hughes, 
“between 2000 and 2010, the average number of women in parliaments nearly doubled, 
from 11.7% to 19.4%. (2013)” While some countries, such as Rwanda and Sweden, have 
seen rapid growth in representation rates, other nations face continued barriers and 
stalled growth in women’s political participation.   
 Although women are not well represented in top political institutions around the 
world, some women have been active in other spheres of political participation, including 
grassroots and community organizing and non-profit people’s organizations. Historically, 
women have played an important role in mobilizing support for liberation and 
democracy movements. Yet, even with their important contributions in political and 
social change movements, few women seldom climb to the top of political power 
structures.  
 Why is political representation at the highest levels of government important? In 
every nation worldwide, political institutions are endowed with the powers to shape the 
institutions, which govern how citizens of their nations work, live, prosper, and thrive. 
Individuals with positions in these institutions hold the power to make decisions regarding 
the policies that shape national policies and investments and legitimate authority for 
society-wide decisions (Paxton and Hughes, 2013).  
 Why does it matter whether women hold political power?  Data shows that 
increased gender representation in political decision-making processes has positive 
outcomes, including increased decision-making power, equitable representative 
democracy, wider range of issues and perspectives being voiced and put on the agenda, 
and greater ability to influence matters that impact the community such as the 
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environment, education, and welfare. There is widespread evidence that male lawmakers 
are less likely to initiate and pass laws that serve the interests of women and children, less 
likely to consider issues impacting women, including rape, domestic violence, women’s 
health and child care (Paxton and Hughes, 2013). Furthermore, women in positions of 
political leadership serve as role models for other women and girls in overcoming 
limitations of traditional gender roles (Karl 2004). Political decision-making quality is also 
enhanced with the inclusion of women’s perspectives. Not only does the inclusion of 
women double the talent pool of potential politicians, it also leads to more diversity of 
views which helps to discern which policies will be most effective (Paxton and Hughes, 
2014).  
 In order for women to make a difference in decision-making, the United Nations 
has stated that they need to have a “critical mass” of at least 30% of representation in the 
legislature. Without this large minority, women’s voices are more likely to be 
marginalized (Paxton and Hughes, 2014). According to the United Nations, for women to 
have an impact in decision-making in top political institutions, this “critical mass” should 
be prioritized. 
 
iii. Relationship between Women’s Access to Financial Resources and Political Participation   
 Can access to financial services empower women to reach political parity? 
Empowering women through microcredit institutions has recently become a popular area 
of study (and NGO investment). As Nallari and Griffith suggest, the literature on this 
topic falls short of a macroeconomic approach and focuses primarily on the impacts of 
empowering women through finance at the household level (2001). This research 
indicates that increased access to credit enhances women’s earning capacity and control 
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of household assets, leading to greater autonomy within the household and greater 
decision-making (Kabeer 1998; Khandker 1998; Pitt and Khandker 1998). This includes 
autonomy in making financial decisions independent of their husbands (Agarwal 1997). 
However, recent literature suggests that increased access to credit helps to reduce poverty 
by enhancing productivity (Kaur 2007). In fact, data shows this in turn leads to women’s 
increased labor market participation, productivity, and income that can be used for 
savings and loans. For example, study conducted on women owned businesses in the 
Middle East North Africa region found that these businesses generate over $100,000 
USD per year in revenues (IFC, 2011). Therefore, women’s access to capital can have 
important impacts on economic growth.  
 How do the benefits of this access to economic services translate to increased 
empowerment (and potentially increased political participation)? There is disagreement 
on this issue. Some scholars argue that access to financial services and economic resources 
is a source of power that leads to empowerment. This is supported by the reality that 
ownership of assets enables the ability to obtain other resources, such as education, work, 
access to mass media, and the ability to fund organizations and campaigns. This in turn 
results in the capability to impact political processes in the long run. However, others 
suggest that these resources are only a prerequisite to power and do not in fact lead to 
empowerment itself (Kapitsa, 2008). In this view, the entrepreneurial process that leads to 
the ability to access capital is a result of “human, social, physical, organizational and 
technological capital possessed by business owners and available to them via their 
personal backgrounds and experiences, contacts relationships, and networks” (Kapitsa, 
2008, pg. 4). Therefore, as a result of this complex interplay of important social factors, a 
causal impact between access to formal financial services and women’s political 
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empowerment is difficult to discern. While there are conflicting points of view on this 
matter, this thesis hopes to explore these relationships for further clarity on this important 
role between access to financial services and representation in political processes. 
 
 
III. Method  
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the potential relationship between 
economic empowerment through the women’s use of formal financial resources and 
women’s political empowerment through women’s political representation in national 
parliaments to determine the existence, direction and strength of a potential relationship.  
 
i. Datasets 
To investigate this research question, a quantitative approach was utilized to 
analyze the statistical significance of the potential relationship between women’s use of 
formal financial resources and women’s national political representation. A multi-country 
dataset from the World Bank’s database, entitled “Gender Equality Data and Statistics” 
(“Gender Statistics”), was used to analyze this relationship. “Gender Statistics” is a 
database comprised of relevant gender-disaggregated indicators from national surveys in 
195 countries. Although available through the World Bank, the data are derived “from 
datasets from the United Nations compiled by its Regional Commissions and Sectoral 
Agencies, as well as World Bank conducted or funded surveys and reports, such as the 
2012 World Development Report on Gender and Development” (World Bank, 2013). 
Although the dataset spans back to 1960 and was last updated in September 2013, 
the dataset coverage is sparse. It does not include information for all 195 countries on 
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each of the variables considered in this study for every year. In fact, for many of the 
variables that were relevant to this analysis gender-based data was available only recently 
starting in 2011. This is mostly due to the fact that collecting development statistics that 
are disaggregated by gender has only recently been considered a policy priority by 
institutions such as the World Bank. In addition, much of the data in the dataset comes 
from national surveys conducted by member countries. Therefore, the availability of the 
valid data relies on whether nations collect data and whether they collect reliable 
gendered data. As a result, there are some nations that must be omitted from this analysis 
due to lack of data on key variables of interest. When omitted, such countries are noted in 
this study. 
 
ii. Variable Selection 
In order to investigate a potential statistical significance between women’s access 
to formal financial resources and women’s political representation, these variables of 
interest must be investigated using appropriate proxies. To examine the extent of 
women’s use of formal financial resources across countries, “Gender Statistics” included 
several relevant proxies listed in Table A. Four of the proxies used measure the use of 
formal financial resources. The other two variables measure use of both formal and 
informal financial resources, including loans in the past year and saved any money in the 
past year. 
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Table A: Women’s Use of Financial Resources Proxies 
 
 
Because each of the variable proxies provides useful insights into different 
dimensions of women’s use of financial resources, all of the above proxies were used in 
this investigation. However, only the first four variables above (including accounts at a 
formal financial institution, loans from a financial institution, saved at a financial 
institution, and credit cards) proxy for women’s use of formal financial resources. Loans 
in the past year and saved any money in the past year are proxies for women’s formal and 
informal use of financial resources (including through non-formal financial institutions, 
such as through family and friends, private lenders, savings clubs, employers, or store 
credit). Given the limited availability of coverage for these proxies across time, this study’s 
analysis was limited to the year 2011. Because all variables proxies are expressed in 
percentage female, this analysis does not need to compare female statistics with male 
statistics because percentage female is a binary of percentage male (1-female percentage = 
male percentage).  
To examine the extent of women’s political participation across countries, 
“Gender Statistics” included one relevant proxy listed in Table B.  
                                                
1 Precise variable definitions were not available on World Bank website.  
Proxy of Analysis Independent Variable1 
(% age 15+) 
Variable Information 
Formal Financial 
Resource Proxies 
Account at a formal financial institution, female 145 countries in 2011 
No other data available 
Loan from a financial institution in the past year, 
female 
145 countries in 2011 
No other data available 
Saved at a financial institution in the past year, 
female 
145 countries in 2011 
No other data available 
Credit card, female 145 countries in 2011 
No other data available 
Formal and Informal 
Financial Resource 
Proxies 
Loan in the past year, female 145 countries in 2011 
No other data available 
Saved any money in the past year, female 145 countries in 2011 
No other data available 
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Table B: Women’s Political Participation Proxy 
Proxy of 
Analysis 
Independent 
Variable 
Variable Information 
Political 
Representation 
Proportion of seats held 
by women in national 
parliaments (%) 
187 observations in 2011 
 
In this study, the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments was 
used as a proxy for political representation and evaluated as the dependent variable for all 
regression analyses. According to the World Bank “Gender Statistics” database, this 
variable represents “the number of seats held by women members in single or lower 
chambers of national parliaments, expressed as a percentage of all occupied seats…it is 
derived by dividing the total number of seats occupied by women by the total number of 
seats in parliament” (World Bank, 2013). Note below that this variable does not cover the 
upper body of bicameral parliaments.2 
In this study, the proportion of seats held by women in national parliament 
variable is an appropriate proxy for women’s political participation because political 
power is frequently concentrated in the highest levels of governance in a nation. When 
women have higher representation in a national parliament, they are more likely to 
exercise their legislative authority to exercise decision-making, shape policy priorities, and 
promote policies that benefit women. Furthermore, equitable gender representation in 
national parliaments has the benefits of impacts mentioned in Background. Therefore, the 
proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments is an appropriate proxy for 
women’s political empowerment.  
                                                
2 “National parliaments can be bicameral or unicameral. This indicator covers the single chamber in 
unicameral parliaments and the lower chamber in bicameral parliaments. It does not cover the upper 
chamber of bicameral parliaments. Seats are usually won by members in general parliamentary elections. 
Seats may also be filled by nomination, appointment, indirect election, rotation of members and by-election.  
 
Seats refer to the number of parliamentary mandates, or the number of members of parliament.”6 
 16 
To determine if there was sufficient evidence to establish a statistically significant 
relationship between the independent and dependent proxies, the impact of contextual 
variables was assessed. Controlling for these contextual variables was important to 
minimize the potential for omitted variable bias, the bias derived from the exclusion of 
variables that might be correlated with women’s use of formal financial services or that 
might impact women’s political representation in national parliaments. Controlling for 
these contextual variables was especially important given that the independent and 
dependent proxies span the diverse contexts specific to the 195 countries included in the 
dataset. These contextual variables are shown in Table C.  
 
Table C: Contextual Control Variable Information 
Control Proxy of Control3 Variable Information 
Quota4 Constructed binary from Quota 
Project data 
0=no quota 
1=any quota (see below) 
N=195 
Wealth GDP per Capita (US$) 2011: N=176 
Labor Force Participation Labor participation rate, female 
(% of female population ages 
15+) 
2011: N=176 
Health Life expectancy at birth, female 
(years) 
2011: N=187 
Education School enrollment, primary, 
female (% gross) 
2011: N=111 
 
Quotas are policy tools that recruit women into political positions by requiring that 
“women must constitution a certain number or percentage of the members of a body, 
whether it is a candidate list, a parliamentary assembly, a committee or a government” 
(Quota Project, 2013). Quotas were controlled in this analysis by constructing a binary 
variable using information available from the “Quota Project” database to determine if 
nations held at least one form of political quotas for women. Nations were coded with a 
                                                
3 Precise variable definitions were not available on World Bank website.   
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zero if no quota of any kind existed. Nations with a quota (including constitutional 
and/or legislative reserved seats, constitutional and/or legislative legal candidate quotas, 
and/or voluntary political party quotas) were coded with a one. It was important to 
control for quotas because quotas directly influence the proportion of seats held by 
women in national parliaments.  
Wealth and health were controlled because both variables are important proxies for 
the level of development in a nation. It is standard practice in the field of development 
economics to include these controls in regression analyses to omit potential variable bias 
they might influence on the relationship of study. In the context of this study, it was likely 
that the level of a nation’s development would be highly correlated with women’s use of 
financial resources. Because of this, it was important to control for these development 
proxies.  
Labor force participation was also controlled in this study. Because the degree of 
women’s participation in the economy will directly impact women’s earnings and the 
need for formal financial resources, it was likely that labor force participation would be 
highly correlated with women’s use of financial resources.  
Finally, education was controlled because it directly impacts the size of earnings an 
individual can make in a lifetime. With higher earnings, the need for financial services 
increases. As a result, this contextual variable was controlled because it was similarly likely 
that this education would be highly correlated with women’s use of financial services. 
While regression analyses were run with this control, a lack of available data for each 
nation in the dataset resulted in the number of observations in the statistical results to 
decrease to 77 nations. Therefore, the small sample size of countries was not 
representative of a global relationship.  
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Using different combinations of controls in eight linear multiple regression models 
(see Appendix C, Models 2-9), these contextual variables were controlled to isolate the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables of interest. This helped to 
eliminate the influence of potential variable bias from quotas, wealth, labor force 
participation, and health on the findings of this analysis. It is important to note that there 
may be other variables relevant to control. However, given limited data availability, only 
those variables listed in Table C were controlled in the regression models of this analysis 
iii. Data Analysis 
A quantitative approach required the use of statistical models and regression analysis 
to interpret the relationship between the degree of women’s access to formal financial 
resources and women’s political representation in national parliaments. In the 
quantitative analyses, women’s use of formal financial resources was assigned to be the 
independent variable and women’s political participation the dependent variable. These 
variables of interest were investigated by using six (see Table A) appropriate proxies for 
women’s use of formal financial resources and one appropriate proxy for women’s 
political representation in 2011 (see Table B.)  
The six independent proxies were evaluated using linear regression analysis versus the 
dependent proxy. To establish a baseline analysis, the single-variable relationships 
between the six proxies for use of financial resources and the proxy for women’s political 
representation were evaluated with the quota binary as the only contextual variable 
included (see Table F, Model A or Appendix C, Model 1). To determine if the baseline analysis 
provided sufficient evidence for a statistically significant relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables and to control for omitted variable bias, as 
mentioned above, the impact of contextual variables was assessed (Appendix C, Models 2-9). 
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Eight regression models were constructed that incorporated different combinations of the 
relevant contextual control variables including quotas, GDP per capita, percentage of 
women’s labor force participation, women’s life expectancy at birth, and percentage of 
women in primary school enrollment (see Appendix C, Models 2-9). 
Using the quota binary, the nations were then separated into those nations with 
women’s political quotas and those without quotas. Regression analyses were then 
completed between the four proxies for women’s use of formal financial resources and the 
proxy for women’s political representation using a model that included the contextual 
control variables of GDP per capita and women’s labor force participation (see Appendix 
D). Because the data for this analysis only addressed one-year, there was not sufficient 
evidence for causal claims to be investigated 
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IV. Findings 
 
i. Summary Statistics  
 
Table D below shows the summary statistics for the dependent, independent, and 
control variables used in this analysis, including mean, standard deviation, and range of 
data in year 2011. 
Table D: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Analysis 
  
Graph 1A shows the distribution of the proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliaments in 2011. The graph shows that most nations fall far below gender parity in 
political representation of national parliaments. In fact, with only thirty nations above 
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Proportion of s eats  he ld by women in 
national parliaments  
(%) N=187
18.27 11.38 0.00 56.30
Account at a formal financial ins titution, 
female
(%) N=145
42.71 32.34 0.80 99.82
Loan from a financial ins titution in the  
pas t year, female
(%) N=145
8.93 6.06 0.49 30.28
Loan in the  pas t year, female
(%) N=145
34.62 13.09 7.66 69.79
Saved at a financial ins titution in the  
pas t year, female
(%) N=145
16.67 16.47 0.08 64.02
Saved any money in the  pas t year, 
female
(%) N=145
33.12 17.31 5.68 82.37.92
Credit card
(% age  15+) N=145
14.64 18.73 0.00 80.03
Quota
(binary)  N=195
0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
GDP per Capita 
($K) N=184
14.13 22.27 0.24 163.03
Labor participation rate , female
(% age  15+)  N=176
53.07 16.02 13.10 88.20
Life  expectancy at birth, female
(years )  N=187
72.20 10.03 45.27 86.34
Primary s chool enrollment, female
(%) N=111
104.16 18.16 42.11 179.00
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30% of women’s political representation in national parliaments, nearly 85% of nations 
fall below this “critical point” recommended by the United Nations. 
Graph 1A: Distribution of Proportion of Seats held by Women in National 
Parliament 
 
Graphs 1B and 1C show the distribution of the proportion of seats held by women in 
national parliaments for those nations with quotas (Graph 1B) and those without quotas 
(Graph 1C). Nations with quotas have an average proportion of seats at 21.16% while 
those without quotas have an average of 13.74% (standard deviation is 10.75%). 
Countries with quotas have a higher average and a higher distribution of seats held by 
women in national parliaments.  
Graph 1B: Distribution of Proportion of Seats held by Women in 
National Parliaments in Nations without Quota Systems 
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Graph 1C: Distribution of Proportion of Seats held by Women in 
National Parliaments in Nations with Quota Systems 
 
Graph 2 shows the distribution of accounts held at a formal financial institution in 
2011. The data shows that in 95% of nations less than 40% of women have accounts.   
Graph 2: Distribution of Accounts at a Formal Financial Institution in 2011 
 
 
 
Graph 3 shows a scatterplot of proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliaments versus the percentage of women with accounts at a formal financial 
institution in 2011. The red line is a linear fit for the scatter plot with an adjusted R-
 23 
squared value of 0.051. This linear fit shows that the higher the percentage of women 
with accounts at formal financial institutions, the slightly higher the proportion of 
parliamentary seats held by women.  
Graph 3:  Scatterplot of Proportion of Seats held by Women in National 
Parliaments on Accounts at a Formal Financial Institution in 2011 
 
 
Table E is derived from Appendix A and highlights nations that fall on the lowest 
(<1%) and highest ends of women’s political representation (>45%) as well as some 
nations that fall around the mean (18.27% +/- 1%). It also includes the quota and 
independent variable data for these nations.    
As evidenced by the low adjusted R-squared value in Graph 3 and the country 
statistics in Table E, there are exceptions to the relationship observed in Graph 3 in which 
the higher the percentage of women with accounts at formal financial institutions, the 
slightly higher the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women. For example, Qatar 
has a high proportion of women with accounts (61.57%) yet no women in national 
parliamentary seats. On the other hand, Rwanda has the highest proportion of women in 
national parliamentary seats (56.3%) but has a low proportion of women with accounts 
(28.25%). 
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Table E: Range of Variables of Interest for Nations on Low, Average, and 
High Ends of Women’s Political Representation5 
Country Percentage of 
Women in 
Parliament 
Account at 
Formal Fin. 
Inst. 
Loan at 
Formal Fin. 
Inst. 
Savings at Formal 
Fin. Inst. 
Quota 
World Averages 18.27 42.71 8.93 16.67 .60 
Qatar 0.0 61.57 9.84 21.16 0 
Saudi Arabia  0.0 15.23 1.40 6.14 0 
Yemen 0.3 1.09 0.74 0.11 0 
Indonesia  18.2 19.21 8.15 15.87 1 
Mauritius 18.8 74.73 9.00 27.06 0 
France 18.9 96.57 17.35 45.70 1 
El Salvador 19 10.13 2.82 8.74 1 
Tajikistan 19 2.14 3.22 0.08 0 
South Africa 42.3 51.02 6.47 20.55 1 
Finland 42.5 99.82 19.48 57.23 0 
Sweden 44.7 99.01 22.47 64.03 1 
Rwanda 56.3 28.25 7.95 12.63 1 
 
 
Graph 4 shows the average national women’s representation in parliament by 
national income level. Except for countries at the lowest end of the national income, there 
is a relationship that indicates that the higher a nation’s income level, the higher the 
female representation in parliament.   
                                                
5 Note: Countries omitted from lack of data: Dem. Rep. Congo, Fiji, Guinea, Kosovo, Libya 
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Graph 4: Average National Women’s Representation in Parliament by 
National Income Level
 
 
Graph 5 shows the average national women’s representation in parliament by 
geographic region by major regional groupings (more detailed geographic regions are 
included in Appendix B). According to this graph and Appendix B, the geographic regions 
with the lowest degree of women’s political representation are the Middle East (10.00%) 
and small Pacific islands (2.67%) The regions with the highest women’s political 
participation rates are the Caribbean (developing only, 32.31%) and the Europe Area 
(26.37%). 
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Graph 5: Average National Women’s Representation in Parliament by 
Geographic Region 
               
 
ii. Regression Analysis 
 
Appendix C provides the full regression analysis results for the proportion of women’s 
seats in national parliaments versus women’s use of financial resources proxies and other 
contextual control variables. In Appendix C, the proportion of women’s seats in national 
parliaments was regressed on each of the six proxies for women’s use of financial 
resources in nine models. Table F-1 shows the variables included in each of these models.  
Table F-1: Appendix C Regression Model Description 
Model Dependent 
Variables 
Independent Variables Controls 
Model 1 Proportion of 
women’s seats 
in national 
parliaments 
Proxies for Women’s Use of 
Financial Services 
Quota 
Model 2 Quota and GDP per 
Capita 
Model 3 Quota and Life 
Expectancy at Birth 
Model 4 Quota and Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
Model 5 Quota, GDP per Capita, 
and Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
Model 6 Quota, GDP per Capita, 
and Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
Model 7 Quota, Life Expectancy, 
and Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
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Model 8 Quota, GDP per Capita, 
Life Expectancy, and 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
Model 9 Quota, GDP per Capita, 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth, Labor Force 
Participation Rate, and 
Primary School 
Enrollment 
 
Table F-2 provides the regression analysis results for the proportion of women’s seats 
in national parliaments versus women’s use of financial resources proxies and other 
contextual control variables for Models 1, 6, 8, and 9 from Appendix C. These models were 
selected for Table F-2 to summarize the findings in Appendix C.  
Model 1 (derived from Appendix C, Model 1) shows the proportion of seats held by 
women in national parliaments versus the use of formal financial proxies with quotas 
controlled for via the inclusion of the quota binary. Model 6 (derived from Appendix B, Model 
6) shows the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments versus the formal 
financial resources proxies with quotas, wealth and labor force participation rate 
contextual variables controlled for via the inclusion of the quota binary, GDP per capita 
and labor force participation rate. Model 8 (derived from Appendix B, Model 8) shows the 
proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments versus the formal financial 
resources proxies with quotas, wealth, labor force, and health contextual variables 
controlled via the inclusion of the quota binary, GDP per capita, labor force participation 
rate, and life expectancy. Because life expectancy and GDP per capita both control for 
omitted variable bias due to the level of development, Model 6 only uses one of these 
controls (GDP per capita) while Model 8 uses both.  Model 9 (derived from Appendix B, 
Model 9) is similar to Model 8 but also includes the rate of primary school enrollment. 
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Because the number of observations drops significantly (N=77), the education control was 
not included in all models.  
In Table F-3, nations without quotas are separated from nations with quotas and the 
independent proxy of accounts at a formal financial institution was evaluated against 
women’s national political participation, controlling for GDP per capita and labor force 
participation rate (the same regression case used in Model 6). The results of these 
regressions for the other proxies of women’s access to formal financial resources are 
shown below (see Appendix D for additional regression results for other independent 
variables).  
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Table F-2: Regression Analysis Results for the Proportion of Women’s Seats 
in National Parliaments versus the Use of Financial Resources Proxies and 
Contextual Variables6 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1: 
Regress 
Independent on 
Proportion of 
Parliamentary 
Seats 
Model F: 
Regress Model 1 
with GDP per Cap 
and Labor 
Participation 
Model H: 
Regress Model 
1 with GDP per 
Cap, Labor 
Participation, 
Life Expectancy 
Model I: 
Regress 
Model 2 with 
Primary 
School 
Enrollment+ 
Accounts in Formal 
Financial Institutions, 
(% female) 
.079 
(0.003)*** 
N=142 
.063 
(.092)* 
N=137 
.0495 
(.25) 
N=137 
.062 
(.31) 
N=77 
Loan from a formal 
financial institution in 
the past year, (% 
female) 
.25 
(.083) 
N=142 
.0615 
(.68) 
N=137 
.0145 
(.93) 
N=137 
.11 
(.63) 
N=77 
Loan in the past year, 
(% female) 
-.048 
(.49) 
N=142 
-.049 
(.48) 
N=137 
-.016 
(.83) 
N=137 
.066 
(.54) 
N=77 
Saved at a financial 
institution in the past 
year, (% female) 
.18 
(.001)*** 
N=142 
.13 
(.10) 
N=137 
.11 
(.16) 
N=137 
.22 
(.09)* 
N=77 
Saved any money in 
the past year, (% 
female) 
.18 
(.000)*** 
N=142 
.10 
(.14) 
N=137 
.10 
(.14) 
N=137 
.13 
(.230) 
N=77 
Credit Card              
(% female) 
.12 
(.009)*** 
N=142 
.063 
(.43) 
N=137 
.034 
(.68) 
N=137 
.47 
(.004)*** 
N=77 
 
Table F-3: Regression Analysis Results for Women’s Use of Accounts at 
Formal Financial Institutions Proxy Disaggregated by Quota 
 Model 6 No Quota (quota=0) Quota (quota=1) 
N 137 38 99 
Adj-R Squared .19 .42 .10 
Accounts at Formal 
Financial Institutions 
.063 
(.092)* 
 
 
.18 
(.001)*** 
-.0043 
(.93) 
Quota 6.94 
(.000)*** 
N/A N/A 
GDP per Capita .000036 
(.57) 
-.00012 
(.11) 
.00015 
(.085)* 
Labor Force Participation 
Rate 
.20 
(.00)*** 
 
.32 
(.00)*** 
.12 
(.010)** 
                                                
6 Note: Coefficient is number without parenthesis and number with parenthesis is P-value. N=number of 
observations.  
*Statistically significant at 90% level 
**Statistically significant at 95% level 
***Statistically significant at 99% level  
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iii. Discussion  
 
Graph 1A shows that most nations fall far below gender equity in political 
representation. With an average worldwide proportion of 18.27% of seats in parliament 
occupied by women, nearly 85% of nations fall far below the United Nations “critical 
mass” of 30% of women’s representation to influence change. In fact, only thirty nations 
achieved this minimum mass. Graphs 1B and 1C, indicate that countries with quotas have 
a slightly higher average of women’s political representation in national parliaments than 
those without quotas (21.16 versus 13.74, respectively).  However, this difference is not 
large.  
While Graph 2 shows that in a majority of nations, less than 40% of women have 
accounts, Graph 3 indicated that the higher the percentage of women with accounts, the 
higher the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women. As shown by Graph 3, there 
are multiple cases where nations have low levels of women with accounts and high levels 
of women’s political representation. When this is this case for nations with more than 
25% of women in parliament and below average (<42.71% of women with accounts at a 
formal financial institution), these nations have quotas for women’s political 
representation. Alternatively, there are also cases where nations have high levels of 
women’s accounts and low levels of women’s political representation. However, these 
nations exhibit no pattern with respect to having quotas. Nations that have average levels 
of women’s political representation have a wide range of levels of use of formal financial 
resources and have no consistent pattern of quotas. 
Table F-2 shows the regression analysis results for the proportion of women’s seats in 
national parliaments versus women’s use of financial resource proxies and contextual 
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variables. In Model A, when the independent variables were analyzed only controlling for 
the quota binary on the proportion of women who hold parliamentary seats, all proxies 
for use of formal financial services were statistically significant at the 99% level except for 
loans from a formal financial institution and loans in the past year. For every regression 
run in Model A, the quota coefficient was at the 99% significance level (see Appendix C).  
In Model 6, the independent variables were analyzed against the proportion of women 
who hold parliamentary seats while controlling for the quota binary, GDP per capita, and 
women’s labor force participation. When controlling for these variables (that were used to 
account the effects for quotas, labor, wealth, and labor force participation), the proxies of 
accounts at a formal financial institution, savings at a formal financial institution and 
saved any in the past year were above or close to the 90% significance levels. Again, the 
quota coefficient for every regression in Model 6 was statistically significant at the 99% 
level. However, the labor force participation coefficient was also statistically significant at 
the 99% level for every regression in Model 6.  
In Model 8, the independent variables are evaluated against the proportion of women 
who hold parliamentary seats while controlling for the quota binary, GDP per capita, 
women’s labor participation, life expectancy (that were used to account the affects of 
quotas, labor participation, wealth, and health), the proxies of savings at a formal 
financial institution and saved any in the past year were close to 90% significance levels (p 
values of .16 and .135 respectively). The quota coefficient and the labor force 
participation coefficient were both statistically significant at the 99% level for each 
regression in this model.  
In Model 9, the independent variables were analyzed against the proportion of women 
who hold parliamentary seats while controlling for the quota binary, GDP per capita, life 
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expectancy, women’s labor participation, and primary school enrollment (that were used 
to account for the affects of quotas, wealth, labor force participation, health, and 
education), only credit cards (99% significance), and saved at a financial institution (90% 
significance) were significant. However, the inclusion of this education control dropped 
the number of observations to 77 and was a statistically insignificant coefficient. Again, 
the quota and labor force participation coefficients for each independent variable in this 
regression was statistically significant at the 99% level.  
When examining the regression results of Appendix C based on the proxy used for 
women’s use to formal financial resources, there is evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship between women’s accounts at a formal financial institution, women’s savings 
at a financial institution, women’s credit card with the proportion of women who hold 
parliamentary seats. The coefficients of women’s accounts at a formal financial institution 
are statistically significant with at least 90% significance in six of the nine models shown 
in Appendix C, (Models 1-6). The coefficients for women’s savings at a financial institution 
were statistically significant with at least 90% significance in seven of the nine models 
shown in Appendix C (Models 1-5, 7 and 9; note: Models 6 and 8 were close to significance 
with p-values of .103 and.106, respectively). The coefficients on women’s credit card use 
are statistically significant with at least 90% significance in four of the nine models (Models 
1, 3, 4, and 9). While percentage of credit cards held by women had slightly less evidence 
of a statistical relationship with the number of seats held by women in national 
parliaments, accounts held by women at a formal financial institution and savings at a 
financial institution had strong evidence of this relationship. Given the coefficients on 
these statistically significant findings were positive and small, there was evidence that 
women’s use of formal financial services is slightly positively associated with women’s 
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national representation in parliaments. In conjunction with the findings of Models 1, 6, 8, 
and 9, this evidence suggests that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
women’s use of formal financial resources and women’s political representation in 
national parliaments. 
When the nations were then separated into those nations with women’s political 
quotas and those without, the results of the regression analysis indicated even stronger 
evidence of a relationship between women’s use of formal financial resources and the 
number of seats held by women in national parliaments (see Appendix D).  However, this 
relationship was only observed in nations that did not have a quota system. Using a 
model that included the contextual control variables of GDP per capita and women’s 
labor force participation, the regression results indicated that there was at least a 99% 
statistically significant relationship between the proxies of women’s use of formal financial 
services, including accounts held by women at a formal financial institution, women’s 
loans and savings at a financial institution, and women’s use of credit cards, for nations 
that did not have a quota for women’s political representation. Although the sample size 
was small for nations that did not have a quota, the strength of this relationship was 
further observed by a high-adjusted R-squared value (Appendix D; .32-.34) in comparison 
to those found in regressions that did not separate nations by quota (Appendix C; .10-.21). 
In the nations that did have a quota for women’s political representation, there was no 
evidence for a statistical significance between women’s use of formal financial resources 
and the number of states held by women in national parliaments.  Therefore, a 
statistically significant relationship between women’s use of formal financial resources and 
the number of seats held by women in national parliaments only exists for nations that do 
not have quotas.  
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In this study, there was strong evidence indicating the importance of quotas on 
women’s political representation. In every regression analysis result, the coefficient on 
quotas was statistically significant at the 99% level. These coefficients were large in 
comparison to the coefficients on other control variables (Appendix C; 5.08-7.03 for the 
quota binary versus -0.03-0.25). The size and significance of these positive coefficients 
indicate that quotas to increase women’s political representation are strongly associated 
with higher women’s political representation. This is consistent with the purpose of 
women’s political quotas to increase women’s political representation. In addition, this is 
consistent with the observation in Graph 1C that nations with quotas have a higher 
average of the proportion of women holding seats in national parliaments.  
Similarly, there was strong evidence indicating the importance of women’s labor 
force participation. In every regression analysis result, the coefficient on quotas was 
statistically significant at the 99% level. Although these contextual control coefficients 
were not as large as those on quotas (Appendix C, .16-.28), this indicated that the degree 
that women participate in the formal economy is a strongly related to women’s political 
representation.  
 Given that this analysis was limited to 2011, causality could not be established on 
the direction of the relationship between women’s access to credit at financial institutions 
and women’s political representation. However, there was sufficient evidence to suggest a 
slightly positive relationship between women’s use of formal financial resources and 
women’s political representation in national parliaments, particularly when no quota 
system exists.  
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V. Policy Implications and Further Research 
Given the results of this analysis, there is evidence to suggest that it is important to 
promote policies that facilitate the inclusion of women in formal financial institutions. 
While no causality was established in this study, nations with greater women’s use of 
formal financial resources were associated with greater gender parity in national 
parliaments.  
This analysis found significant evidence that women’s use of formal financial 
resources is associated with higher women’s political representation in national 
parliaments in nations that do not have quotas for women’s political participation. 
Because the analysis was limited to the data available in the year 2011, further research 
should be pursued to analyze the consistency of this relationship across time to determine 
causality of this relationship. If the results found in this study were borne out by further 
research, a potential policy implication for these results would be to formulate policies to 
increase the use of women’s formal financial resources in nations where quotas do not 
exist. However, this study indicates that policies that promote such financial inclusion 
should emphasize access to women’s accounts at financial institutions and women’s 
savings at financial institutions over promoting women’s loans at financial institutions. 
Given the recent trend in development economics in promoting policy that provides loans 
to women as a mechanism for women’s empowerment, the evidence in this analysis 
suggests that this policy should be reassessed. 
While this study examined women’s political representation in national parliaments, 
follow-on areas for further research on women’s political empowerment could include 
examining women’s representation in other political institutions (heads of state, 
ministerial positions, upper house of bicameral legislatures), women’s representation at 
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other levels of government (regional, provincial, local), and the extent to which women 
participate in other political sphere worldwide, including voting and grassroots 
organizing. Other areas for potential further research could also include examining the 
geographic differences that might contribute to geographic differences in women’s 
political participation.   
The strong statistical significance associated with higher labor force participation 
by women suggests that a relationship exists between the degree that women participate 
in the formal economy and the number of women who hold seats in national parliament.  
If further research confirms this relationship, policies that help women to overcome 
barriers to labor force participation, such as job training programs or childcare support, 
should be considered.  
 In addition, the strong statistical significance associated with higher women’s 
political representation in national parliaments in nations where a women’s political 
quota is in place suggests that quotas should be promoted as a policy to improve gender 
parity in political institutions.  While this analysis was limited in the specificity and 
variation used to define quota systems around the world, an area of further research is to 
examine the types of quota systems that are most effective in promoting gender parity.  
Women are still far from reaching gender parity in representation of top political 
institutions worldwide. Without such parity, it is difficult for societies to gain the benefits 
that come from gender parity in policy decision-making. Therefore, it is important to 
craft policy that promotes such parity around the world.  
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VI. Conclusion 
In nations do not have a quota for women’s political representation, there is evidence 
of a statistically significant relationship between women’s use of formal financial resources 
and women’s national political representation. However, in nations that do have a quota 
for women’s political representation, there is no evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship between women’s use of formal financial resources and women’s national 
political representation. The results of this study indicate that when a nation’s goal is to 
promote the representation of women in national parliaments, policies should be 
considered that will facilitate women’s use of formal financial services.  
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I. Appendix  
A. National Observations on Independent and Dependent Variables, sorted in descending order of 
Women’s Proportion of Seats in National Parliaments  
 
Country Prop. of 
Seats in 
Nat'l 
Parliaments  
Account at a 
Formal 
Financial 
Institution 
Loan from a 
Financial 
Institution 
in the past 
year 
Saved at a 
Financial 
Institution 
in the past 
year 
Quota 
Binary 
Rwanda 56.3 28.24671 7.950524 12.63624 1 
Andorra 50    0 
Cuba 45.2    0 
Sweden 44.7 99.01312 22.46914 64.02469 1 
Seychelles 43.8    0 
Finland 42.5 99.8177 19.48407 57.22858 0 
South Africa 42.3 51.02337 6.470269 20.55223 1 
Netherlands 40.7 98.39974 9.151627 54.47229 1 
Nicaragua 40.2 12.81508 6.592514 6.859719 1 
Iceland 39.7    1 
Norway 39.6    1 
Mozambique 39.2 35.47271 5.396072 14.83712 1 
Denmark 39.1 99.4979 19.24979 54.84122 1 
Costa Rica 38.6 40.66185 7.840293 13.4324 1 
Angola 38.2 38.92834 7.339787 13.24354 1 
Belgium 38 97.18457 12.71261 38.55079 1 
Argentina 37.4 31.81856 7.8105 3.618399 1 
Spain 36 91.66148 9.674451 32.15982 1 
Tanzania 36 13.82398 6.865949 11.40124 1 
Uganda 35 15.06352 8.612303 12.61037 1 
Nepal 33.2 21.21961 9.649933 7.109428 1 
Germany 32.9 98.70454 10.92474 54.84963 1 
Ecuador 32.3 33.15992 9.932518 10.7578 1 
Timor-Leste 32.3    1 
New Zealand 32.2 99.4483 25.43897 58.13282 0 
Slovenia 32.2 98.1096 12.08908 29.18134 1 
Belarus 31.8 58.07224 15.67754 6.770185 0 
Guyana 31.3    1 
Macedonia, FYR 30.9 71.54489 10.08486 7.517654 1 
Burundi 30.5 5.928003 0.5300382 2.921388 1 
Portugal 28.7 77.80403 6.455556 19.45911 1 
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Trinidad and 
Tobago 
28.6 69.85585 7.087932 41.27208 1 
Switzerland 28.5    1 
Austria 27.9 96.56331 7.823859 50.48574 1 
Ethiopia 27.8    0 
Afghanistan 27.7 2.61623 4.925391 0.8737874 1 
Tunisia 26.7 25.22964 2.780615 3.850408 1 
South Sudan 26.5    1 
Mexico 26.2 21.96588 6.688293 6.403767 1 
Bolivia 25.4 25.10577 17.58055 16.42994 1 
Iraq 25.2 7.547668 4.64817 2.656306 1 
Lao PDR 25 26.15621 17.22371 18.98046 0 
Luxembourg 25 95.32555 16.01912 48.51065 1 
Canada 24.8 97.23316 17.82475 52.94839 1 
Australia 24.7 98.59229 15.26236 58.96765 1 
Sudan 24.6 4.354855 1.819269 2.416649 1 
Namibia 24.4    1 
Vietnam 24.4 18.90926 15.23619 6.677731 0 
Lesotho 24.2 16.86643 2.680136 7.155986 1 
Liechtenstein 24    0 
Croatia 23.8 87.18468 14.92715 13.71214 1 
Poland 23.7 68.2872 7.737828 16.20692 1 
Kyrgyz Republic 23.3 3.944267 11.30374 0.9783548 1 
Latvia 23 92.04856 8.193994 12.43838 0 
Philippines 22.9 33.71373 12.8403 18.031 1 
Senegal 22.7 5.450442 2.472498 3.021333 1 
Pakistan 22.5 2.953578 1.935123 0.6671928 1 
Malawi 22.3 16.88244 11.68936 8.891019 1 
United Kingdom 22.3 97.65199 11.24206 41.45037 1 
Singapore 22.2 98.21179 6.27649 58.71869 0 
Mauritania 22.1 12.08743 7.257361 5.116176 1 
Czech Republic 22 80.51359 8.772821 33.37513 1 
Eritrea 22    1 
Serbia 22 62.31583 14.40484 3.39322 1 
Uzbekistan 22 21.29315 1.236033 0.5424895 1 
Italy 21.6 64.34535 3.196751 12.42344 1 
Peru 21.5 17.56129 12.35431 7.814788 1 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
21.4 47.72136 12.65102 5.192334 1 
China 21.3 60.00867 6.133404 32.09019 1 
Bulgaria 20.8 55.45132 7.376585 4.73976 0 
Cape Verde 20.8    1 
Dominican 
Republic 
20.8 37.37682 12.0522 15.3768 1 
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Cambodia 20.3 3.712341 20.08803 0.246133 0 
Israel 20 92.43819 15.16874 24.14126 1 
Estonia 19.8 97.26136 7.299046 28.37461 0 
Moldova 19.8 17.17139 6.556089 3.49937 1 
Bangladesh 19.7 34.89121 22.32131 15.133 1 
Honduras 19.5 14.92036 6.452175 6.193172 1 
Lithuania 19.1 76.06694 5.574603 21.54978 1 
El Salvador 19 10.13223 2.815245 8.738501 1 
Monaco 19    0 
Tajikistan 19 2.135162 3.218527 0.0761863 0 
France 18.9 96.57256 17.35121 45.69997 1 
Mauritius 18.8 74.73274 9.002164 27.06183 0 
Greece 18.7 75.70966 5.066993 21.73693 1 
San Marino 18.3    0 
Indonesia 18.2 19.20753 8.151073 15.86503 1 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
18.2    0 
Kazakhstan 17.8 43.73284 14.39212 6.331445 1 
United Arab 
Emirates 
17.5 47.20844 7.923073 15.1256 0 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
17.4    0 
Morocco 17 26.68675 3.622184 5.586821 1 
Venezuela, RB 17 36.15054 1.49087 9.658226 1 
Turkmenistan 16.8 0.7939227 1.066074 0.2299886 0 
United States 16.8 84.06905 18.27112 47.63561 0 
St. Lucia 16.7    0 
Azerbaijan 16 14.25925 15.32948 1.326089 0 
Slovak Republic 16 78.91837 10.3377 35.43148 1 
Thailand 15.8 72.63754 17.93429 42.82499 1 
Albania 15.7 22.67261 5.994867 6.786743 1 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 15.6    0 
Burkina Faso 15.3 10.81371 2.873962 6.022847 1 
Ireland 15.1 92.20029 14.38807 52.63711 1 
Zimbabwe 15 37.12441 4.247175 16.97056 1 
Korea, Rep. 14.7 93.10782 12.87975 47.71442 1 
Chile 14.2 40.97443 5.874371 10.42378 1 
Gabon 14.2 17.17236 1.323205 5.166698 0 
Turkey 14.2 32.67998 2.412485 2.001607 1 
Cameroon 13.9 10.88144 3.412774 7.189256 1 
Djibouti 13.8 8.762782 3.818295 2.725754 1 
Russian 
Federation 
13.6 47.70323 7.429877 11.55273 0 
Swaziland 13.6 27.41395 10.00523 15.34778 0 
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Grenada 13.3    0 
Guatemala 13.3 15.58662 11.18453 6.160515 1 
Niger 13.3 1.451922 1.555224 0.9899623 1 
Sierra Leone 12.9 12.80254 6.477045 10.60969 1 
Chad 12.8 6.769446 6.048054 5.044189 0 
Jamaica 12.7 67.12254 7.636121 26.46701 0 
Central African 
Republic 
12.5 3.411752 0.9483109 2.712689 0 
Dominica 12.5    0 
Madagascar 12.5 4.611975 1.616486 1.458682 0 
Paraguay 12.5 22.71478 12.93029 9.280089 1 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
12.4 19.588 11.49726 4.747674 0 
Montenegro 12.3 48.92861 20.16367 3.038284 1 
Bahamas, The 12.2    0 
Colombia 12.1 25.35456 10.56265 8.328886 1 
Uruguay 12.1 23.82965 13.68546 5.955068 1 
Suriname 11.8    0 
Zambia 11.5 23.33739 7.849719 13.06459 0 
Romania 11.2 41.06061 6.722723 8.59155 1 
Togo 11.1 9.217669 4.29252 2.629911 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 11    1 
India 11 26.4905 6.742837 7.095501 1 
Japan 10.8 96.8449 3.509211 53.72907 0 
Jordan 10.8 17.3577 3.566669 6.595288 1 
Cyprus 10.7 83.07365 24.69956 25.6635 1 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
10.5    0 
Malaysia 10.4 63.09647 10.27674 30.18593 0 
Mali 10.2 6.909979 1.858731 3.325105 1 
Bahrain 10 48.77767 6.202654 11.25193 0 
Barbados 10    0 
Equatorial Guinea 10    0 
Guinea-Bissau 10    0 
Kenya 9.8 39.17881 6.788294 19.20147 1 
Liberia 9.6 14.68394 5.711397 11.09582 1 
Hungary 8.8 73.0622 10.22446 16.50885 1 
Kiribati 8.7    0 
Malta 8.7 94.07024 7.4375 39.27093 1 
Brazil 8.6 51.01785 6.126243 7.802369 1 
Bhutan 8.5    0 
Panama 8.5 23.3099 8.301247 11.53034 1 
Armenia 8.4 18.14856 19.4945 1.096303 1 
Benin 8.4 9.807354 5.171425 6.258737 0 
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Ghana 8.3 27.0883 5.842479 14.48267 1 
Algeria 8 20.4073 0.4886589 2.955965 1 
Ukraine 8 39.20775 8.042524 5.14596 0 
Botswana 7.9 28.36033 4.938264 15.61857 1 
Kuwait 7.7 79.60854 17.06288 38.04803 0 
Gambia, The 7.5    0 
Congo, Rep. 7.3 6.784462 1.518981 3.696842 0 
Nigeria 6.8 25.9904 1.951395 20.90756 0 
Somalia 6.8 27.29579 0.7867508 9.697814 1 
St. Kitts and Nevis 6.7    0 
Tuvalu 6.7    0 
Georgia 6.6 34.92281 12.21247 1.481105 1 
Maldives 6.5    0 
Sri Lanka 5.8 67.23842 19.39564 26.223 1 
Haiti 4.2 21.07225 10.01751 16.28275 1 
Samoa 4.1    1 
Mongolia 3.9 82.365 24.37819 25.42971 1 
Tonga 3.6    0 
Myanmar 3.5    0 
Lebanon 3.1 25.89981 8.484057 10.20525 1 
Comoros 3 17.89296 5.845753 10.95054 0 
Marshall Islands 3    0 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2.8 61.87651 30.27675 17.11458 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 6.517278 2.748747 0.6768445 1 
Vanuatu 1.9    0 
Oman 1.2 63.52985 6.172167 17.86066 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.9    0 
Yemen, Rep. 0.3 1.089594 0.7406023 0.1050647 0 
Belize 0    0 
Micronesia, Fed. 
Sts. 
0    0 
Palau 0    0 
Qatar 0 61.56953 9.846316 21.15514 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 15.23301 1.395731 6.144174 0 
Solomon Islands 0    0 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  2.751882 1.544402 0.7088403 0 
Fiji     0 
Guinea  2.934914 1.480353 2.080213 1 
Kosovo  31.45454 5.552346 3.910238 0 
Libya     1 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
 
    0 
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B. Regional and Income Comparison of Political Participation by Nation 
Region Percentage of Women in Parliament 
Arab World 11.34% 
Caribbean (developing only)  32.31% (highest) 
Caribbean Small States 15.85% 
Central Africa (developing only) N/A 
Central America (developing only) 22.99% 
Central Asia (developing only) 20.00% 
East and Southern Africa (developing only) 24.77% 
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels) 17.73% 
East Asia & Pacific (developing only) 17.87% 
Eastern Asia (developing only) 19.90% 
Eastern Europe (developing only)  13.10% 
Euro Area 26.37% 
Europe & Central Asia (all income levels) 22.71% 
Europe & Central Asia (developing only) 15.34% 
European Union 24.86% 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 20.36% 
High Income 23.27% 
High Income: non-OECD 14.15% 
High Income: OECD 25.42% 
Latin America & Caribbean (all income levels) 23.04% 
Latin America & Caribbean (developing only) 23.88% 
Least Developed Countries: UN Classification 20.60% 
Low & Middle Income 18.59% 
Low Income 20.46% 
Lower Middle Income 14.36% 
Middle East (developing only) 10.00% 
Middle East & North Africa (all income levels) 10.06% 
Middle East & North Africa (developing only) 10.52% 
Middle Income  17.90% 
North Africa 11.03% 
North America 20.11% 
OECD Members 24.16% 
Other Small States 15.81% 
Pacific (developing only) 2.67% (lowest) 
Pacific Island Small States N/A 
Small States 13.97% 
South America (developing only) 19.40% 
South Asia 20.34% 
South Asia, excluding India 23.04% 
South-Eastern Asia (developing only) 17.40% 
Southern Europe (developing only) 15.96% 
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels) 20.55% 
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only) 20.68% 
Upper Middle Income 20.44% 
West Africa (developing only) 11.82% 
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C. Regression Results for Dependent Variable Regressed on Each Independent Variable with 
Contextual Control Variables   
Regression Analysis Results for Accounts in a Formal Financial Institution 
Proxy 
  Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
N 142 139 142 140 139 137 140 137 77 
Adj. R 
Squared 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.21 
Accounts in 
Formal 
Financial 
Institutions 
0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 
(0.00)*** (0.09)* (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.06)* (0.09)* (0.11) (0.25) (0.31) 
Quota 
6.33 6.58 6.38 6.52 6.72 6.94 6.44 6.83 6.61 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)** 
GDP per 
Capita 
  
  
0.00   
  
  
  
0.00 0.00   
  
0.00 0.00 
(0.70) (0.62) (0.57) (0.65) (0.80) 
Life 
Expectancy 
at Birth 
  
  
  
  
-0.06   
  
-0.09   
  
0.11 0.08 0.15 
(0.59) (0.42) (0.31) (0.48) (0.33) 
Labor 
Force 
Participatio
n Rate 
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.19   
  
0.20 0.21 0.21 0.26 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Primary 
School 
Enrollment 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.00 
(0.99) 
 
Regression Analysis Results for Loans at a Financial Institution Proxy 
  
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
N 142 139 142 140 139 137 140 137 77 
Adj. R Squared 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20 
Loans at a 
Financial 
Institutions 
0.25 0.13 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.11 
(0.08)* (0.40) (0.23) (0.14) (0.39) (0.68) (0.89) (0.93) (0.63) 
Quota 
6.42 6.80 6.33 6.60 6.85 7.15 6.37 6.89 7.16 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
GDP per Capita   
0.00 
    
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
(0.06)* (0.08)* (0.02)** (0.18) (0.74) 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth     
0.08 
  
-0.03 
  
0.23 0.15 0.19 
(0.39) (0.81) (0.02)** (0.18) (0.21) 
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Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate 
      
0.18 
  
0.20 0.23 0.23 0.27 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Primary School 
Enrollment 
                
-0.01 
(0.94) 
 
Regression Analysis Results for Loan Any Money in the Past Year Proxy 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
N 142 139 142 140 139 137 140 137 77 
Adj. R Squared 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20 
Loan Any 
Money in the 
Past Year  
-0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.07 
(0.49) (0.89) (0.94) (0.24) (0.89) (0.48) (0.97) (0.83) (0.54) 
Quota 
6.04 6.77 6.21 5.97 6.78 6.84 6.34 6.81 7.59 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
GDP per Capita   
0.00 
    
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
(0.03)** (0.06)* (0.02)** (0.18) (0.74) 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
    
0.13 
  
-0.01 
  
0.24 0.14 0.25 
(0.18) (0.96) (0.01)** (0.22) (0.09)* 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate 
      
0.20 
  
0.21 0.24 0.23 0.28 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Primary School 
Enrollment 
                
-0.01 
(0.86) 
 
Regression Analysis Results for Savings at a Financial Institution Proxy 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
N 142 139 142 140 139 137 140 137 77 
Adj. R Squared 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.23 
Savings at a 
Financial 
Institutions 
0.18 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.22 
(0.00)*** (0.02)** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.02)** (0.10) (0.06)* (0.16) (0.09)* 
Quota 
6.42 6.55 6.43 6.53 6.59 6.92 6.43 6.73 5.88 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.03)** 
GDP per Capita   
0.00 
    
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
(0.77) (0.83) (0.67) (0.94) (0.39) 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth     
-0.01 
  
-0.02 
  
0.14 0.12 0.18 
(0.94) (0.85) (0.16) (0.26) (0.19) 
Labor Force 
Participation       0.17   0.18 0.20 0.20 0.24 
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Rate (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Primary School 
Enrollment 
                
0.00 
(0.99) 
 
Regression Results for Saved Any Money in the Last Year Proxy 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
N 142 139 142 140 139 137 140 137 77 
Adj. R Squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.21 
Saved Any 
Money in the 
Last Year 
0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 
(0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.14) (.036)** (0.14) (0.23) 
Quota 
7.15 7.17 7.08 7.10 7.10 7.29 6.83 7.02 6.50 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)** 
GDP per Capita   
0.00 
    
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
(0.96) (0.89) (0.37) (0.88) (0.63) 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
    
0.04 
  
0.04 
  
0.16 0.15 0.27 
(0.63) (0.72) (0.07)* (0.16) (0.12) 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate 
      
0.16 
  
0.17 0.20 0.20 0.24 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Primary School 
Enrollment                 
0.00 
(0.99) 
 
Regression Analysis Results for Credit Card Proxy 
  
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
N 142 139 142 140 139 137 140 137 77 
Adj. R Squared 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.29 
Credit Cards 
0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.47 
(0.01)*** (0.33) (0.04)** (0.01)*** (0.31) (0.43) (0.23) (0.68) (0.00)*** 
Quota 
6.38 6.55 6.38 6.55 6.70 7.03 6.43 6.85 6.67 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
GDP per Capita 
  0.00     0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
  (0.62)     (0.60) (0.42)   (0.55) (.049)** 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
    
0.00 
  
-0.03 
  
0.16 0.13 0.09 
(0.99) (0.80) (0.13) (0.22) (0.51) 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate 
      0.19   0.20 0.22 0.22 0.23 
      (0.00)***   (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
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Primary School 
Enrollment 
                
0.03 
(0.70) 
 
D. Regression Results for Disaggregation by Quota  
 
Loans at a Financial Institution Proxy 
 
  Model 6 
No Quota 
(quota=0) 
Quota 
(quota=1) 
N 137 38 99 
Adj-R Squared 0.18 0.32 0.12 
Saved at a Financial 
Institutions 
0.06 0.53 -0.29 
(0.68) (0.01)*** (0.16) 
Quota 
7.15 
N/A N/A 
(0.00)*** 
GDP per Capita 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.02)** (0.79) (0.00)*** 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
0.20 0.27 0.18 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
 
Loans in the Past Year Proxy 
 
  Model 6 
No Quota 
(quota=0) 
Quota 
(quota=1) 
N 137 38 99 
Adj-R Squared 0.18 0.16 0.11 
Loan in the Past Year 
-0.05 0.02 -0.06 
(0.48) (0.84) (0.50) 
Quota 
6.84 
N/A N/A 
(0.00)*** 
GDP per Capita 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00)*** (0.39) (0.02)*** 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
0.21 0.29 0.18 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
 
Saved at a Formal Financial Institution Proxy 
 
 
Model 6 
No Quota 
(quota=0) 
Quota 
(quota=1) 
N 137 38 99 
Adj-R Squared 0.19 0.32 0.10 
Saved at a Financial 
Institutions 
0.13 0.28 0.02 
(0.10) (0.01)*** (0.87) 
Quota 
6.92 
N/A N/A 
(0.00)*** 
GDP per Capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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(0.67) (0.23) (0.16) 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
0.18 0.27 0.16 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
 
Saved Any Money in the Past Year Proxy 
 
 
Model 6 
No Quota 
(quota=0) 
Quota 
(quota=1) 
N 137 38 99 
Adj-R Squared 0.19 0.19 0.11 
Saved Any Money in 
the Past Year 
0.10 0.12 0.09 
(0.14) (0.22) (0.34) 
Quota 
7.29 
N/A N/A 
(0.00)*** 
GDP per Capita 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.37) (.97) (0.29) 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
0.17 0.27 0.14 
(0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.05)** 
 
Credit Card Proxy 
  Model 6 
No Quota 
(quota=0) 
Quota 
(quota=1) 
N 137 38 99 
Adj-R Squared 0.18 0.34 0.11 
Saved at a Financial 
Institutions 
0.06 0.31 -0.10 
(0.43) (0.01)*** (0.36) 
Quota 
7.03 
N/A N/A 
(0.00)*** 
GDP per Capita 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.42) (0.09)* (0.03)** 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
0.20 0.27 0.17 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
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